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ABSTRACT 
This paper forms part of the research on the transmission of 
monetary policy via the interest rates of Spanish banks and savings 
banks, analysed from a disaggregated perspective. In this respect, it 
considers structural factors that cannot be taken into account in more 
aggregated studies, as for example the different characteristics of the 
markets where credit institutions operate. 
The study's objective is to analyse the differences in the velocity 
and degree of responsiveness of lending and deposit rates to movements 
in interbank rates, according to the institutions' product specialisation. 
To this end, it explores the information available for each institution over 
the period 1991-1994, drawing on quarterly data. 
The results obtained evidence of the differences between banks 
whose core business is traditional retail banking and more specialised 
banks, which are much more sensitive to market conditions, particularly 
on the deposit side. 
In addition, the findings point towards more competitive behaviour 
in the establishment of lending rates than in the case of deposits. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is 
decisive in understanding and assessing the impact of the measures taken 
by the monetary authority -through the instruments available to it, above 
all the intervention rate- on the variables that affect its final targets. 
The monetary policy target of the Banco de Espana is the control of 
inflation, and it uses the intervention rate to send signals to the system. 
Monetary impulses pass through a complex transmission process in which 
diverse markets, agents and variables intervene, ultimately affecting the 
nominal expenditure of the economy. 
Basically, the transmission mechanism operates via the behaviour 
of three variables(ll: the exchange rate, market interest rates, and 
expectations -variables which are, in turn, inter-related. 
The transmission mechanism via interest rates has been specifically 
addressed in a number of studies, both at the aggregate level (see, for 
example, Sastre, 1 99 1 ,  and Mestre, 1995) and the disaggregated level, 
that examine its effects on different sectors of the economy (see, for 
example, Escriva and Haldane, 1994, Estrada et aI., 1 994, Hernando, 
1995, and Penalosa, 1995 ) .  The latter works have shown the importance 
of disaggregation by type of agent, instrument and term in analysing the 
transmission process. 
Given the significant role played by credit institutions in the 
intermediation of the financial flows of an economy, one particularly 
important area of study is how they set their price policies. In this 
respect, the product specialisation of credit institutions (see Sanchez and 
Sastre, 1995) -and, by extension, the type of customer with which they 
(11 For a more detailed analysis, see, for example, Peiialosa (1995 ) .  
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deal- deserves special attention . The fact that the institutions· price 
policies differ raises the question of the importance of the structural 
elements of the markets where they operate and the degree and the 
velocity of the adjustments of lending and deposit rates to money market 
rates (see, for example , Borio and Fritz, 1995 ) . 
This paper is a first approximation to these issues for the Spanish 
case, using the information available for each institution -here banks and 
savings banks are considered- for a given period -panel data . 
The first problem that arises in analysing the prices of credit 
institutions is the choice of representative indicators. due to the high 
degree of substitutability among the bank assets and liabilities for which 
interest rates are set. If the study is to be manageable, each and every 
instrument ,  and the relations between them, cannot be analysed . Either 
several of these instruments must be selected more or less discretionally, 
or composite indicators, reflecting the institutions' price policies, must 
be constructed. 
In this paper, we chose the second method, constructing the 
aforementioned indicators to obtain composite rates for the lending and 
borrowing transactions of Spanish banks and savings banks with their 
customers. The use of composite rates, rather than a selection of interest 
rates of representative transactions, is preferable in view of the fact that 
cost accounting, which allows individual price-setting for each product 
and service, is so far not a very widespread practice in Spain, and thus 
it seems plausible to assume that credit institutions set their price policies 
for certain groups of highly substitutable assets and liabilities. Within 
these groups of assets/liabilities, the institutions practice a certain price 
&iSCrimination, depending on the type of customer at which the 
transactions are targeted. By way of example , credit institutions can 
attempt to offset changes in the yield of a given type of deposit 
characterised by a high degree of sensitivity to prevailing market 
conditions with changes in other deposits characterised by a greater 
degree of customer loyalty. 
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Composite rates were computed for each of the institutions, taking 
account of the heterogeneity observed among them. In this respect, our 
study differs from others in which composite rates are calculated for 
aggregate groups of institutions, namely banks and savings banks (see 
Cuenca, 1994 ) .  Thus, the characteristics of the price policies of banks 
and savings banks in their customer relations were drawn up at an 
individual level for the period 1988-1994, and this in turn allowed the 
construction of indicators for the different groups of institutions, 
classified according to their product specialisation (see Sanchez and 
Sastre, 1995 ) .  
These indicators allowed us to analyse the characteristics of credit 
institutions' price policies and their relation to one of the key 
determinants in prices, i. e. interbank rates, whose behaviour is closely 
related to the signals sent by monetary policy. The study shows that the 
dynamics of the institutions' price adjustments to changes in interbank 
rates depend on each one's product specialisation. 
These findings are consistent with the conclusions of studies 
focusing on concrete countries (see, for example, the case of Italy in 
Cottarelli, Ferri and Generale, 1995, and Angeloni et aI. , 1995) and of 
others that analyse the differences in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms in several DECO countries in terms of the characteristics of 
their respective financial and banking systems (see Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994 ) .  
Starting from the relationship between the price policies of credit 
institutions and interbank rates, it is possible to arrive at hypotheses on 
the degree of competition that exists in the markets where these prices 
are set and the price elasticities of the institutions' customers (see 
Sumner, 1981 , Catalao, 1994, and Hannan and Liang, 1993 ) .  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the main 
features of the lending and deposit rates calculated for each group of 
institutions. An estimation is also given of the percentage of interest­
bearing sight deposits at banks and savings banks, demonstrating the 
heterogeneous behaviour within the group formed by banks. Section III 
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describes the differences in the price policies of the groups of banks and 
savings banks classified by product specialisation. Section IV gives an 
estimation of the relationship between the price policies of the groups in 
question and interbank rates, from which hypotheses can be drawn as to 
the institutions' leeway for setting prices according to the markets where 
they operate. Lastly, Section V presents the conclusions, including 
several macroeconomic implications derived from the results obtained. The 
details of the construction of the composite rates and the models used are 
given in Appendices I and 1I, respectively. 
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II. MAIN FEATURES OF THE INTEREST RATE DISTRIBUTION OF 
BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS 
The camp.osite interest rates used as indicators of the price policies 
of banks and savings banks in transactions with customers were 
calculated as the weighted averages of their lending and deposit rates, in 
which the weighting was determined by the share of each instrument in 
the total lending and deposit transactions considered (see Appendix I for 
fuller details) . 
Tables 1 and 2 give the distribution of the composite lending and 
deposit rates of banks and savings banks. As shown, during the 1988-
1994 period, the composite deposit rate of banks was approximately one 
percentage point higher than that of savings banks. This reflects the 
historically stronger competition among banks than among savings banks 
to capture deposits, derived from the differences in the type of customer 
of the two groups. Since 1990, however, the composite deposit rates of 
banks and savings banks have become steadily more aligned, a process 
that became particularly intense in 1994. This phenomenon is not 
unrelated to the increasingly more competitive behaviour of several major 
savings banks, whose activity has become increasingly similar to that of 
banks, and it also reflects the more homogeneous regulations governing 
the two groups. The composite lending rates of both groups also trended 
in the same direction, with their respective rates reaching very similar 
levels. 
Meanwhile, throughout the period, the intra-group variability of 
the price policies of banks was notably greater than that of savings 
banks. This is explained by the fact that the . bank aggregate is more 
heterogeneous than in the case of savings banks, due to the more diverse 
activities of banks. This result raises the question of whether the 
traditional disaggregation between banks and savings banks adequately 
reflects the differences in their conduct, or whether the bank aggregate 
includes a group of institutions that is so heterogeneous that it could bias 
the analysis of the relationship between the variables in aggregate terms. 
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Table 3 shows the distribution of the estimated proportion of low­
yield sight deposits in the two groups. Interestingly enough, the 
proportion is higher for savings banks than for banks, once again 
reflecting the behavioral differences between the two. Savings banks 
have characteristically obtained most of their funds from term deposits, 
conferring little importance to yields on sight deposits. However, 
beginning in 1990, with the greater competition for customers' funds, 
they were forced to increase the remuneration on these deposits to 
prevent their shift to other institutions offering higher yields. As a 
result, in the years 1991-1993, the difference in the percentage of 
interest-bearing sight deposits of banks and savings banks narrowed. In 
any case, the percentage of low-yield deposits within the total volume of 
sight deposits in both groups of institutions is still high, surpassing 40%, 
according to our estimates(21. 
One point worth underscoring is that, until 1990, the intra-group 
variability of this percentage -measured by the inter-quartile range- was 
higher for banks than for savings banks, due once again to the greater 
heterogeneity in the business of institutions in the bank group. As of that 
year, the heterogeneity of savings banks tended to increase and that of 
banks to decrease, causing the degree of dispersion within the two 
groups to converge. 
( 2, These estimates are similar to those at the aggregate level 
in Cuenca (1993). 
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OIS'I.1UBUTIOlf OF 7BB PKlPORl'IOIf OF LOW-YIELD DEPOSITS 
FiJ::.t quartile ..... ian Third quartile 
0' 0' 
y-
Ban .. Savings Banko Savings B� Saving_ 
..... ..... banl<s 
1988 0.42 0.70 0.61 0.83 0.81 0.94 
1989 0.37 0.60 0.60 0.77 O.7S 0.90 
1990 0.28 0.47 0.46 0.60 0.64 0.77 
'99' 0.27 0.30 0.41 0.51 0.56 0.65 
'99' 0.25 0.30 0.43 0.52 0.56 0.62 
'99' 0.26 O.ll O.B 0.51 0.55 0.63 
'99' 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.64 
Ill. PRODUCT SPECIALISATION AND PRICE POLICIES 
Table 3 
Inter-quartile 
r� .. 
(Q3 - Q1) 
� savingll 
ban"" 
0.39 0.24 
0.38 0.30 
0.36 0.30 
0.29 0.35 
0.31 0.32 
0.29 0.32 
0.34 0.31 
As already shown in the preceding section and in a number of 
studies (see , for example , Sanchez and Sastre , 1995, and Manzano and 
Sastre , 1995 ) ,  the behaviour of credit institutions , and the bank group 
in particular. is highly heterogeneous . This makes it more difficult to 
analyse the bank group in aggregate terms . 
In Sanchez and Sastre (1995). there is evidence that product 
specialisation is a basic factor in explaining the differences in the 
behaviour of credit institutions . Product specialisation is related to the 
activity in certain markets, size , and other features of a markedly 
structural nature . 
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For these reasons, it is worthwhile examining the extent to which. 
the price policies of the groups differ, depending on their product 
specialisation. 
Sanchez and Sastre (1995) distinguish the following groups in terms 
of product specialisation: 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
Group 3: 
Group 4: 
Basically formed by national banks specialised in 
commercial banking, representing 37% of the total 
credit institutions studied. 
Consisting almost entirely of savings banks, 
accounting for 33% of the total. 
Mostly formed by foreign banks, representing 18% of 
the total. 
Encompassing merchant banks and banks active in 
lines of business other than commercial banking, 
accounting for around 12% of the total. 
Charts 1 and 2 show the lending and deposit rates applied to 
customers(J), reflecting the differences in the behaviour of the four 
groups. 
In general, the rates of Groups 1 and 2, mostly specialised in retail 
banking, present similar patterns of behaviour and also a lesser degree 
of intra-group variability (see Tables 4 and 5) . 
Note that in Groups 3 and 4, mainly formed by foreign banks and 
non-commercial banks, the lending rate as of 1990 remained clearly below 
that of the other groups, whose rates were more similar. Also, the deposit 
rates of Groups 1 and 2, specialised in commercial banking, were 
(J) The rates for each strategic group were calculated from a 
weighted average based on the composite rates obtained for each 
institution. 
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systematically lower than the yields offered by Groups 3 and 4 ,  formed by 
foreign and merchant banks. As of 1993, a clear response to the decline 
in money market interest rates is observed in both the lending and deposit 
rates of all four groups. 
Groups 1 and 2 obtained larger financial margins (difference 
between lending and deposit rates), surpassing those of foreign and 
merchant banks by 2 to 3 points throughout the period 1990-1994 . In 
addition to factors related to operating costs, this phenomenon 
undoubtedly reflects the type of customer of commercial banks, 
characterised by a greater degree of loyalty than in the case of more 
specialised institutions. 
The financial margins of all groups tended to narrow over time (see 
Table 6) due, among other factors, to heightened competition. During the 
period in question, Groups 3 and 4 showed greater intra-group variability 
than the other two. This appears to be due to the greater homogeneity in 
the business lines of commercial banks than in the activities of institutions 
more specialised in specific market niches. Nonetheless, throughout the 
period studied, all four groups registered a decline in intra-group 
variability, and this decline was more intense in the groups characterised 
by greater variability (Groups 3 and 4)  . 
In analysing the financial margin of the total bank group (see Table 
6), it becomes obvious that an aggregate analysis does not provide a clear 
picture of the behaviour of these institutions. In 1994 the median of this 
variable was 5% for banks as a whole, whereas this percentage was around 
6% for Group 1 ,  4% for Group 3, and 3% for Group 4 .  The aggregate 
financial margin of the bank group fails to reflect the different behaviour 
of the credit institutions that form this group. 
It should be noted that a portion of the financial margin is used to 
cover costs that are not explicitly taken into account, such as the cost 
related to the legal reserve requirement and other expenses of a non­
financial nature. By way of example, Chart 3 gives an estimation of the 
cost borne by credit institutions due to the existence of the reserve 
-21-
. 
i I • 
I I � 
I I ! I 
• 
" 
. t t � " f----
! I 
tt .. 
� " �" Ir-=.-
" !:l ! z" I " "  
:.l:i 
�g it '"" .. !!l illi " �" �� i� 
�� j � " " 
.. 
. i I 
z 
i � 
! I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
,; · , , 
· , , · 
0 " · " 
· · · " 
· · · 
· · 
· 
· • .,; 
0 0 " " 
,; · · , 
· · " " " 
· · 0 
• 
� � � � 
· · 
• 
0 · 
· 
" " 
" · 
0 " · 
· 
" · 
· " 
• , 
" · 
" 
· , 
: 
• .. 
� � 
-22-
1 
1 
f 
f 
I 
I 
, ... "'0 
COST DERIVED FROM 
RESERVE REQUIREMENT 
,.., ,. 
E!l .... O--
- 23 -
Chart 3 
requirement(4), which is now low but in the past was fairly high; 
notably, in 1990, it was still estimated at around 1.5 points. In addition, 
the groups bear different operating costs, and this partly explains the 
difference in their net financial income, insofar as the institutions set 
objectives for the final profit on their transactions. In this sense J Groups 
1 and 2, whose financial margins are higher, bear higher operating 
expenses per unit of asset than Groups 3 and 4. In 1994 the operating 
cost per unit of average total assets in Groups 1 and 2 was approximately 
2.5%, whereas this figure stood at around 1% in Groups 3 and 4. 
Thus, given the structural differences among the groups in 
question, the spreads between their lending and deposit rates should be 
compared with caution, since there is no reason why these differentials 
should tend to become aligned. 
In addition, with respect to the differentials of lending and deposit 
rates with the 3-month Interbank rate (see Table 7) , the largest spreads 
are found in Groups 1 and 2, particularly in their deposit rates. In 
general, until 1993, the deposit rate differential exceeded that of lending 
rates in all four groups. 
Throughout the 1990-1994 period, the spreads of lending and 
deposit rates vis-a.-vis the interbank rate trended differently. Thus, 
lending rates evolved at a pace quite similar to that of the interbank rate, 
with the spread between the two remaining fairly stable. By contrast, the 
spread between deposit rates and interbank rates tended to narrow in all 
four groups, albeit more sharply in those with lower deposit rates 
(Groups 1 and 2). Even so, in 1994, the deposit rates of Groups 3 and 4 
remained closer to the interbank rate than those of Groups 1 and 2. 
(41 For this estimation, it was assumed that the opportunity cost 
of the assets retained by the reserve requirement is the interbank 
lending rate. As from May 1990, after this requirement was lowered, the 
mandatory investment of credit jnstitutions in Banco de Espana 
certificates and the opportunity cost of the same were taken into account. 
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The differentials vis-a.-vis the interbank rate are explained by 
differences in operating costs, the price elasticities in the demand / supply 
of loans/deposits{5), the nature of the interaction among institutions 
that operate in the same market segments, and, probably, the risk 
premium charged by the institutions according to their type of customer. 
Consequently, on the basis of these differentials, conclusions cannot be 
drawn regarding the degree of competition in markets without taking 
other factors into consideration, as we shall see in the next section . 
• 
In conclusion, differences are observed between the price policies 
of the groups primarily engaged in traditional commercial banking, 
Groups 1 and 2, and those of foreign banks and merchant banks, Groups 
3 and 4. These differences stem from the nature of their activity and, by 
extension, from the features specific to the markets where they operate. 
This gives an idea of the importance of disaggregation in an analysis of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
IV. PRICE POLICIES AND INTERBANK RATES 
Credit institutions set their price policies according to the 
information derived from the rates which they use as a reference, and 
they also take into account structural factors that characterise the 
markets where they operate. 
Interbank rates play a crucial role as rates of reference reflecting 
the actions of the monetary authority. Their role has undoubtedly become 
stronger as a result of the gradual reduction in the variability of the 
Banco de Espana's intervention rate. This milder variability has reduced 
the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the movements in the 
monetary authority's rates and has thus helped to strengthen the 
relationship between the interest rates of the system. 
{S) The terms loan and deposit are used in the broad sense to 
reflect lending and borrowing transactions', respectively, with 
customers. 
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In setting the rates for their transactions, credit institutions take 
as their reference several indicators of interest rates, both short-term 
interbank rates and rates at longer terms, since they establish rates for 
different maturities and different types of transaction, such as loans with 
fixed and variable rates, for example. 
Long-term rates basically reflect agents' expectations about the 
future course of short-term rates, if we accept the expectation hypothesis 
regarding the conduct of the yield curve. In the Spanish case (see 
Restoy, 1995), even though this hypothesis does not hold in the strict 
sense, it can be accepted that spot rates for time frames of less than 10 
years provide a reasonable approximation to these expectations. 
This analysis does not contemplate long-term rates, in that 
expectations about interest rates are considered to be essentially a 
function of observed interbank rates, and the forecasting errors derived 
from the expectations thus formed are stationary. As a result, the 
relationship between the rates set by credit institutions and interbank 
rates can be consistently estimated without taking into account other 
reference rates(6). Consequently, the estimated relationships will take 
into consideration the effect of interbank trends on expectations. 
The aforementioned simplification is due to the fact that the basic 
objective of this study is to analyse the relationship between interbank 
rates and the price policies set by credit institutions, taking into account 
the peculiarities of each institution and, by extension, the structural 
characteristics of the markets where they operate, leaving the analysis 
of the role of expectations for a later development of the study. 
In this sense, the empirical evidence shows that the relationship 
between bank rates and interbank rates depends on the nature of the 
institutions' business and structural factors in the markets where they 
(6) It should be noted that, having used a data panel method in the 
estimations, variables with cross-sectional change over time cannot be 
explained solely with a set of variables that only changes over time J due 
to identification problems. 
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operate (see, for example, Hannan and Liang, 1993, and Angeloni et aI. , 
1995). For this reason, it seemed worthwhile to study this relationship in 
terms of the groups of institutions classified by product specialisation. 
In the next section, these relationships are formalised under a 
simple model. 
4.1. Price behaviour model 
Let us assume a simple model in which the institutions participate 
in credit and deposit markets in a context of more or less imperfect 
competition. Each credit institution takes funds from the private sector 
in the form of deposits, Di, which it uses in turn to grant loans to this 
sector, Ci• Additionally, let us suppose that there is an interbank market 
where each institution can borrow (loan) the surplus (shortfall) between 
loans and deposits, at the interest rate set by the market and which is 
considered exogenous for each institution. In addition, the institutions 
bear operating costs, COi, derived from their activity(7). 
In this context, each institution has the objective of a profit 
maximising function, IT i , setting a price for loans and a price for 
deposits, P� y P� (8). 
Therefore, the profit function of the institution, i, is: 
(7) The existence of the legal reserve requirement is left aside, 
because its low level during the period covered in the estimations (1991-
1994) is not likely tJ. alter the results of the analysis. Moreover, studies 
at the aggregate level reflect no influence of the reserve requirement on 
the rates applied by credit institutions to new transactions in the period 
considered. 
(8) For simplicity, we will assume the separability of the credit market 
and the deposit market. 
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From the first-order conditions of profit maximisation, we find that 
the institutions will set the following prices: 
P� = 
pO 
, 
= 
where: 
" 
1 
1 + 
1 
1 + 
pC 
, 
� 
I (r + adCC�') 
" 
(r - adC�') I 
u;: 
y 8, aD, 
apo , 
pO 
, 
U; 
( 1 ) 
(2 ) 
i.e. elY 91 are the price elasticities of loan demand and deposit 
supply(,j. 
Thus, each institution will set its price policy to ensure that the 
loan granted is such that the marginal income is equal to the marginal 
cost, and that the deposits received are such that the marginal cost of 
obtaining funds on the interbank market -interbank rate- is equal to the 
marginal cost of obtaining funds via deposits. 
(9J These elasticities not only take into account the sensitivity of the 
demand and supply of each institution's loans and deposits to the price 
which it sets, but also the impact of the reaction of the other institutions' 
prices on said demand and supply -conjectural changes and cross price 
elasticities; in other words, these elasticities refer to the so-called 
residual demand curve (see Bresnahan, 1989). 
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Expressions ( 1) and (2) can be re-ordered such that: 
P; = (r + aco,) + 1 � � 
1 
� 
(1 ' ) 
(2' ) 
where '1 Y Di are, respectively, price semi-elasticities of loan demand 
and deposit supply. 
Expression (1') can be interpreted in the usual sense that 
institu tions establish the price of loans by adding a margin to the marginal 
costs, with this margin depending on the price elasticity of credit 
demand. 
The price equations ( 1 ) - (2) and (1')-(2') are equivalent 
express�ons. If we want to find the equilibrium price that the institutions 
will finally set (reduced-form equation for prices), we must solve a 
system of equations in which the specification of the functions of the 
demand and supply of loans and deposits are taken into account to 
substitute the elasticities/semi-elasticities with their corresponding 
expressions. 
If the specifications of the demand and supply functions are not 
available, and we want to estimate a reduced form for prices from 
expressions (1) and (2) , or alternatively (1') and (2') , under certain 
hypotheses relative to the form of these functions, we can assume a linear 
relation(lO) between prices, the interbank rate and marginal operating 
costs. If, in addition, we assume that the marginal operating costs are 
(10) In this paper, as in other studies at the aggregate level, a linear 
relation will be assumed to exist between bank rates and the interbank 
rate. This assumption should be tested, especially if asymmetrical 
reactions to rises and falls in interbank rates seem to exist. But, given 
the simplicity of the equations estimated here, this subject will be 
addressed in later research. 
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independent of the interbank rate, a linear relationship between the 
prices set by the institutions and the interbank rate can be consistently 
estimated. 
Thus, we would obtain the following reduced forms: 
(3) 
P� rn�r+vi (4 ) 
where m� y rn� are parameters to be estimated, and ui Y Vi are random 
shocks. 
However, unless the functional forms of deposit demand and supply 
are known, we have no information on the values that the parameters 
m� Y rn� can take. In effect, if we substitute in the expressions (1)-(2) 
or (1')-(2') the price elasticities or semi-elasticities derived from their 
demand and supply functions, the coefficients m; y m� will depend on 
the characteristics of these functions. To interpret the coefficients 
estimated, we must necessarily refer to the characteristics of these 
functions. 
For simplicity's sake, we will refer to the case of the demand 
function of loans, although the analysis is, of course, equally applicable 
to the case of the supply of deposits. 
There are three types of demand function that can give rise to a 
linear relation such as the one shown in equation (3) (see Hannan and 
Liang, 1993): 
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1. Isoelastic demand functions(ll), which cause a bi-univocal 
relation to be established between the sensitivity of the lending 
price to the interbank rate and the elasticity of the demand curve, 
such that: 
m
C 
1 
1 
� 
£ 
(5 ) 
and, therefore, said coefficient will be unitary if and only if 
demand is perfectly elastic. 
2. Demand functions with constant semi-elasticity(12), which cause 
the lending price to be exactly the same as the marginal cost plus 
a margin independent of the price, such that m� always has a 
unitary value independent of the value of the semi-elasticity and, 
therefore, irrespective of the competitive conditions of the market. 
3. Demand functions with elasticities and semi-elasticities that change 
according to the price. 
These functions are of the type: 
P� = a + �C� a >  a, � > 0, 6 < 0, 6, Il < 0, 6> a 
where the linear functions are a particular case when 6 1 .  
In this case it can be demonstrated that: 
C 1 mi 
= r+o 
(11) These functions are of the form: 
(12J These functions are of the form: 
- 32 -
pC 
1 
pC 
1 
1 
�c� 
a + � In(C,) 
Concretely, for the case of linear demand : 
m
' 
1 
1 
"2 
Therefore. with these functions. m; can be more than. less than 
or equal to unity, unless the price does not depend on the quantity, in 
which case this coefficient will be exactly unity . 
It seems plausible to assume that both the demand elasticity in case 
1 and the coefficient {j of the demand function in case 3 depend on the 
market structure of the product in question (see Hannan and Liang, 
1993 ) ,  and, by extension, on prevailing competitive conditions. Thus, the 
lesser the leeway of firms to set their prices, the greater the perceived 
elasticity of their demand curves ( 13 j, insofar as they anticipate the 
reactions of their closest competitors . 
The greater the perceived elasticity of demand, the higher the 
value of e and the lower the value of 6 will be, and the closer the 
coefficient linking price and marginal cost will be to unity (see Sumner, 
1981, and Catalao, 1994 ) .  
In concluding, if we estimate reduced forms in which the prices set 
by institutions are related to the interbank rate, their interpretation will 
depend substantially on the functional forms of the demand and supply of 
loans and deposits. Thus, the coefficient that liriks the lending price with 
the interbank rate, if a linear relation between them exists, can be more 
than, less than or equal to one. In the case of the deposit price, this 
coefficient can be less than or equal to one. 
In view of the above, the question arises as to whether any 
conclusion can be drawn regarding the price elasticity of the demand 
(supply) of loans (deposits) from the linear relation between prices and 
(13 )  The perceived elasticity will be the elasticity of residual demand, 
e. g. that remaining after the reactions of competitors are taken into 
account. 
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the interbank rate. In the absence of information on the functional form 
of demand (supply), other than the fact that it gives rise to a linear 
relation between the price and the interbank rate (see footnote 9) , there 
are several possibilities: 
1 .  Demand and supply functions have constant semi-elasticity, in 
which case the coefficients m� y m1 are always unity, 
irrespective of price elasticity and market conditions. 
2.  Demand and supply functions have constant elasticity. In this case, 
there is a bi-univocal relation between the coefficients m� y m� 
and price elasticities. Thus, if these coefficients are equal to 
unity, price elasticities tend to infinity, in which case the situation 
would be similar to that resulting from competitive equilibrium 
(Bertrand-Nash) . 
3. The elasticities and semi-elasticities of demand and supply 
functions are not constant -the case of linear functions, for 
example. Here m� y m� will be unity only if prices do not depend 
on the quantity A>f loans and deposits negotiated by each 
institution; in this case, the situation would be similar to that 
resulting in competitive equilibrium. 
In conclusion, in demand/supply functions with constant semi­
elasticity, the coefficients m� y m1 will always be equal to . unity, 
irrespective of the market's competitive · conditions. With isoelastic 
functions or with elasticity and variable semi-elasticity, the closer these 
coefficients are to unity, the greater the price elasti�ities of loan demand 
and deposit supply will be, and the markets' behaviour will be more 
competitive. 
Several factors explain why each institution's demand and supply 
of loans and deposits are not perfectly elastic, includjng, for example, 
the existence of switching costs, which induce a certain degree of 
customer loyalty, and the absence of substitutes similar to bank products 
(see Hannan and Berger, 1991 , and Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994 ) .  
Moreover, there is reason to believe that these elasticities are greater in 
- 34 -
the long run than in the short run, as demonstrated in the empirical 
evidence in different financial systems (see Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994) . 
For these reasons, in the short run, lags may be observed in the 
response of lending and deposit rates to changes in interbank rates, 
which could be due to the adjustment costs borne by the institutions (see 
Hannan and Berger, 1991) and also to a certain stickiness in the demand 
and supply of loans and deposits. 
In the short run, the adjustment costs can cause institutions to 
deviate from equilibrium behaviour, as reflected in equations ( 1 )  and ( 2 ) ,  
insofar as demand and supply are inelastic and the cost of deviating from 
the new equilibrium does not exceed the internal adjustment costs derived 
from a change in price policy. In the long run, the adjustment costs fade 
away, and, if they do not, the cost of deviating from an equilibrium 
situation would surpass the adjustment costs, due to the increase in the 
elasticity of demand and supply, in which case the institutions would tend 
to move towards the equilibrium position. 
Taking into account these considerations, we estimated the 
response of lending and deposit rates to changes in interbank rates for 
banks and savings banks, and also analysed the differences between 
institutions that could be attributable their product specialisation. 
4 . 2 .  Sensitivity of price policies to interbank rates 
Equations ( 3 )  and (4) were estimated for the period 1990-1994 for 
the four groups of banks and savings banks classified by product 
specialisation, since they deal with different types of customer and, in 
consequence, the demand and supply functions of their loans and deposits 
may differ. 
Likewise, within each specialised group, separate information on 
each institution was taken into account in order to enhance the degree of 
freedom in the estimates and to consider the possible existence of 
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individual effects. Thus, drawing on quarterly data, we used panel 
data'''} for each group for the years 1990-1994. The use of panel data 
meant that a relatively short period of time could be considered in 
estimating relations of interest, thereby strengthening the plausibility of 
the hypothesis that the estimated relations were not appreciably altered 
by changes of a structural nature. 
Equations (3) and (4) were estimated separately(l5), using the 
composite rates of each institution's transactions with customers and 
taking the 3-month rate(16) as an indicator of interbank market rates. 
In addition, it was assumed that institutions do not immediately 
adjust to the equilibrium situation, due to the existence of adjustment 
costs and different long- and short-term price elasticities. Therefore, in 
estimating equations (3) and (4) , the responsiveness of prices to the 
interbank rate was allowed to differ in the short and long run. 
The details of the procedures used in the estimates are given in 
Appendix II. 
4.2.1  Lending rates 
In the short run, the �stimated response of lending rates to the 
interbank rate differed significantly from one group to another (see Table 
8).  In the long run, there was generally no significant difference in their 
( U )  Incomplete panel data were used, e.  g. not all the 
institutions necessarily had data for the entire period, since some began 
or ceased to operate in the period considered -the case of mergers, for 
example. 
(15) The error terms of these equations are probably correlated, 
but their joint estimation offers no advantages over individual estimates 
because the same regressors are used. 
( 16) Estimates were made both with the 3-month interbank rate 
and the average interbank rate on all outstanding transactions in this 
market. The results given here are those based on the 3-month rate, 
although the total estimated effects of both rates are similar, with 
differences arising only in the initial impact, since the rate on 
outstanding operations is "softer" (see Manzano' and Galmes, 1995) . 
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responsiveness, with the exception of Group 2 ,  whose response was 
significantly different from that of the other groups. 
In the case of Group 2, primarily formed by savings banks, the 
average estimated response of loan prices to the interbank rate was the 
weakest among the groups considered. It should be noted that, in Group 
2 ,  unlike the other groups, there were signs that the levels of lending 
rates are not entirely explained by the levels of interbank rates (it is not 
clear whether these variables are cointegrated), and, for this reason, we 
chose to explain the changes in this group's lending rate in terms of the 
changes in the interbank rate. This situation might be attributable to the 
fact that, in the case of savings banks, due to the weight of mortgage 
loans, lending rate levels reflect the combined effects of the interbank 
rate and the public debt rate. 
The confidence interval for the response of Group 4 is the widest 
of those estimated. Most likely this is related to the considerable 
heterogeneity of the institutions in this group and the scant importance 
of lending in comparison with other activities (see Sanchez and Sastre, 
1995) . 
In all groups other than Group 2, mainly formed by savings banks, 
the estimated total average impact of a change in the interbank rate on the 
lending price is more than unity, for a confidence level of 95% (see Table 
8 ) .  This result coincides with the findings for the case of Spain and other 
countries in Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994 ) .  
In estimating responses significantly different from unity, it can be 
rejected that the demand functions of loans present constant semi­
elasticities, which would imply estimated coefficients equal to unity; here 
we would be dealing with another type of demand function in which the 
value of the price elasticity of customers affects the estimated relation. 
Considering that the estimated responses are somewhat higher than unity 
and that the assumption of constant elasticity is very strong and implies, 
for example, that the impact on the relative change in the lending rate is 
the same if rates rise from 1% to 2% (a 50% increase) or if they go from 10% 
- 38 -
to 20%, which seems quite improbable, then it is plausible to assume the 
existence of demand functions of the type: 
with such functions, as noted earlier, the sensitivity of the lending rate 
to the interbank rate is : 
c m, 1 
1 + 6 
such that, starting from the total estimated effects, the values of 6 can 
be found (see Table 9 ) .  As shown, the demand functions do not appear 
to be linear, and, in the case of Groups 3 and 4 ,  loan demand is 
significantly more elastic than in Groups 1 and 2. Nonetheless, the 
existence of very dissimilar behaviour within Group 4 should be borne in 
mind. 
In line with the results obtained, the hypothesis that institutions 
have a certain leeway to set prices cannot be rejected, since they confront 
demand curves that are not perfectly elastic � which could be due, among 
other reasons, to the existence of product differentiation. 
As to the dynamics of the estimated relations, it should be pointed 
out that, within three qual'ters, the interest rate of loans was fully 
adjusted to a change in the interbank rate. Group 2 ,  formed by savings 
banks, showed a significantly slower response than the other groups. 
Groups 3 and 4 were significantly swifter in their response. 
As a result, even though the total effect of a change in the 
interbank rate on lending rates is high and sirililar in all groups (except 
Group 2), the response in the short run differs significantly by group 
- 39 -
Table 9 
ESTIMATION OF THE 6 OF THE LOAN DEMAND FUNCTION 
GROUP 6 95' confidence 
interval 
Group 1 - 0 . 17 ( -0 . 18 ;  -0 . 15 ) 
Group 2 0 . 5 1 ( 0 . 43 ;  0 . 6 1 )  
Group 3 -0 . 1 3 ( -0 . 15 ;  -0 . 13 )  
Group 4 - 0 . 1 5  ( - 0 . 2 1 ;  - 0 . 0 8 )  
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(see Table 8( 17 ) ) .  Groups 3 and 4 establish lending rates in a very 
competitive setting , whereas Groups 1 and 2 deal with customers whose 
demand is more rigid, thus providing these institutions with greater 
leeway in setting their rates. Among other reasons, this could be 
attributable to the fact that their "product" is more differentiated -in 
other words , their customers place a higher value on factors other than 
price. 
4.2.2 Deposit rates 
The responsiveness of deposit rates to the interbank rate differs 
in the short and long run (see Table 10) in all groups. Differences by 
group are also detected both in the short and long run. 
Group 2 is estimated to be the least sensitive to changes in the 
interbank rate, both in the short and long run, and Group 4 is the most 
sensitive. With respect to Group 2 ,  it should be noted that, unlike what 
occurred in the case of the lending rate, the deposit rate level does 
appear to be explained by the level of the interbank rate. 
In rejecting the hypothesis of a unitary coefficient for the 
interbank rate in the estimated reduced forms J the existence of supply 
functions of deposits with constant semi-elasticity is rejected. Hence we 
either have supply functions with constant elasticity, which seems quite 
restrictive, or functions of the type: 
d , 
Pi = a + P di a , P > 0 6� 0 
Assuming the above functions, the estimated values for the 
coefficient 6 (see Table 11)  indicate that the deposit supply in Groups 
3 and 4 is characterised by higher elasticities than in the case of Groups 
1 and 2 ,  which appear to have more leeway in setting their deposit rates J 
(17)  This result coincides with the findings in Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994) for a sample of OECD countries in which Spain was 
included. 
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Tab1.e 1.1. 
ESTIMATION OF THE 6 OF THE DEPOSIT SUPPLY FUNCTION 
GROUP 6 95' confidence 
interva1. 
Group 1 0 . 49 ( 0 . 44 ;  0 . 5 3 )  
Group 2 0 . 58 ( 0 . 5 1 ;  0 . 67 )  
Group 3 0 . 44 ( 0 . 3 1 ;  0 . 6 1 )  
Group 4 0 . 2 3 ( 0 . 1 4 ;  0 . 33 )  
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eithe.r because the structure of the markets where they operate is less 
competitive or because of the existence of product differentiation. In any 
event, according to the results obtained , deposit rates are set in less 
competitivQ conditions than those of lending rates . 
As to the dynamics of the estimated relations , the total effect of a 
change in the interbank rate on the deposit rate arises within two 
quarters . 
Unlike the case of lending rates. the initial impact of a change in 
the interbank rate is less than the subsequent effect (except in Group 4 ) ;  
thus, in the case of deposits , the institutions take longer to revise their 
prices than in the case of loans . 
In conclusion, different behaviour is observed in lending and 
deposit markets in nearly all the groups in question , albeit to a lesser 
degree in Groups 3 and 4 .  This could indicate that customers in these two 
markets are different or, what is more probable , that the behaviour of the 
same type of customer changes from one market to another. Several 
factors explain this behaviour: first , the switching costs perceived by 
customers may be greater in the case of deposits than in the case of 
loans ( lB} , and, second, a significant percentage of deposits have a 
transaction motive and are not significantly determined by interest rate 
considerations( 19) . 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
This paper presents a disaggregated analysis by institution to 
examine the relationship between money market interest rates and the 
rates set by deposit institutions . For this purpose . we compiled indicators 
( lB) Most probably, in the case of deposits ,  customers' decisions 
are more related to factors other than price, such as 'the location of 
branches , number of tellers , personal relationship with the institution, 
reputation , etc. 
( 19) The fact that around 45% of sight deposits generate 
practically no yield would support this explanation. 
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for the price policies of each institution, and this allowed us to analyse 
the characteristics of these policies and the differences between one 
group of institutions and another. 
The findings underscore the heterogeneity in the rate-setting 
procedure for transactions with customers , not only between banks and 
savings banks , as traditionally evidenced, but also within the group of 
banks. These differences reflect the diversity in the institutions I product 
specialisation. 
On average, those institutions whose core business focuses on 
retail banking tend to set the highest rates on loans and also the lowest 
yields on deposits . This could be due not only to the composition of their 
transactions, with a smaller share of operations that are more sensitive to 
market rates, but also to the fact that their customers , regardless of the 
nature of their transactions with the institution, are generally less 
sensitive to the market situation. Moreover, the price policies of these 
institutions are characterised by greater uniformity than those of banks 
specialised in merchant and wholesale banking, although there is an 
increasing tendency towards homogeneity among all the groups in 
question. 
This behaviour is reflected in the larger financial margin per 
transaction generated by the groups that focus more on retail banking. 
It should be noted that there is no reason why these margins should be 
the same in all cases , since the operating costs of these institutions and 
the risks they assume are not the same. 
In analysing the differentials of lending and deposit rates with the 
3-month interbank rate, we find that , throughout the period 1990-1994, 
the lending rate spread remained quite stable , whereas the deposit rate 
spread tended to narrow in all the groups considered. Here, too, 
traditional retail banks presented the largest differentials, in both 
lending and deposit rates. 
In the financial margin per transaction, one aspect worth 
highlighting is that the behaviour of credit institutions classified by 
- 45 -
,product specialisation tended to become less heterogeneous, possibly 
indicating greater competition among institutions that interact on the same 
markets. 
The relationship between the price policies of credit" institutions 
and interbank rates provides information on the competitive conditions in 
which prices are set. In the absence of a complete structural model for the 
behaviour of institutions, under certain hypotheses, such as the ones 
used this paper, it is possible to estimate reduced forms in which a 
relationship is drawn between the prices set by these institutions and 
interbank rates. Starting from these forms, inferences can be made as to 
the different groups' leeway in setting prices. 
On the basis of our analysis, several observations can be made: 
1 .  The total impact of a change in the interbank rate on the rates set 
by credit institutions occurs over a period of two quarters. 
2 .  Lending and deposit rates differ in their sensitivity to the 
interbank rate. In general, whereas the institutions set interest 
rates on loans under quite competitive conditions, the same cannot 
be said of deposits, where their room for manoeuvre in setting 
prices is less dependent on market conditions. 
3 .  Responsiveness to the interbank rate differs according to each 
institution's product specialisation, particularly in the case of 
deposit rates, where there seem to be significant differences 
between traditional retail banks and more specialised institutions. 
4 .  Among the groups considered . savings banks generally reflect less 
sensitivity to changes in interbank rates. 
5 .  The greater leeway detected in the setting of deposit rates may be 
related to the importance of factors other than prices, such as the 
size of the institutions' branch network, the services offered, etc. , 
which their customers value. This would explain the weaker 
sensitivity of the deposits of traditional banking institutions with 
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extensive branch networks, for example , vis-a.-vis the greater 
sensitivity of other institutions that lack networks of this type . 
6. The price policies of the groups primarily formed by foreign and 
merchant banks are the most sensitive to changes in interbank 
rates . These groups do not normally engage in retail banking, and 
tend to specialise in the wholesale sector . As a result, part of their 
customers are firms, which are likely to be particularly affected by 
the high sensitivity of interest rates to the interbank rate and , 
therefore , will bear the impact of changes in interest rates to a 
greater degree than other agents if they are unable to cover their 
financing requirements internally or via other alternative sources 
(see Peilalosa, 1995 ) .  
7 .  The findings in this paper signal the importance of the behavioral 
heterogeneity among the institutions considered , with indications 
that the price elasticity of the customers of traditional retail banks 
is lower than that of the customers of more specialised banks . The 
heterogeneity in the institutions' price policies -albeit now less 
pronounced- is related to the type of market where they operate , 
and differences will persist as long as there are structural 
differences between one market and another .  These markets not 
only influence the composition of the institutions' assets and 
liabilities , but also probably affect the degree of sensitivity of the 
same asset andlor liability at different types of institution. 
8 .  According to our estimations , the financial margin obtained by the 
institutions on new transactions. tends to increase when interbank 
rates increase , and to decrease when these rates decrease . If this 
situation is contemplated from the standpoint of the economies of 
households and firms , we can conclude that monetary policy -via 
the channel of interest rates- has a greater impact on the financial 
costs than on the financial income of the private sector of the 
economy, in both the long and the short run. Thus, ceteris 
paribus , it could be inferred that the so-called income effect helps 
to enhance the efficiency of monetary policy (for an analysis of this 
effect ,  see Peilaiosa, 1995 ) .  
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9 .  The study shows that the differences between institutions that 
operate in different markets must be taken into account in 
macroeconomic analysis , because, unless they are, it is uncertain 
how representative the aggregate data actually are, in that they 
are an average based on clearly differentiated behaviour. At the 
aggregate level, possibly the simplest way to address this 
heterogeneity is to consider at least two sets of institutions within 
the bank group , i .  e.  those engaged in commercial banking of a 
retail nature and the more specialised institutions . 
10. Our estimations signal several consequences regarding the 
functions of loan demand and deposit supply that affect credit 
institutions. Thus J the hypothesis that these functions have 
constant price semi-elasticities is rejected, and indications of non­
linearity are found. 
In the period analysed ( 1991-1994) , the long-term behaviour of the 
loan market , irrespective of the type of institution considered, was much 
more competitive than that of the deposit market . In this sense, there 
appears to be a certain margin for an increase in the sensitivity of deposit 
rates to market conditions. 
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APPENDIX I. CONSTRUCTION OF COMPOSITE INTEREST RATES 
Banking institutions handle a large number of transactions 
involving diverse instruments,  with different terms and different 
customer segments .  Since each and every interest rate applied in private­
sector transactions cannot be taken into account , either several 
representative rates must be used or an attempt must be made to 
synthesise the information in composite indicators . In this paper, we 
decided to construct composite indicators , basically because of the 
difficulty in choosing the interest rate of a given instrument as the most 
representative of credit institutions' price pOlicies .  
These indicators (see Cuenca, 1994) are a weighted average of the 
rates reported by the institutions for their new transactions with 
customers, with the weightings reflecting the relative importance of each 
transaction within the total considered. Since no data are available on the 
volume of new transactions , the information on the outstanding balance 
of each transaction is used . 
In other studies (see Cuenca, 1994 ) ,  these rates are obtained for 
banks and savings banks at an aggregate level. In this paper, a similar 
method is used to construct individual rates for each institution . Thus , 
composite rates can then be estimated for groups of institutions classified 
by criteria such as size , operational sphere and product specialisation . 
Composite interest rates for private-sector loans were obtained by 
aggregating the interest rates on transactions entailing peseta­
denominated credit granted by banking entities . Here a distinction was 
drawn between transactions involving fixed rates and those with variable 
rates . With respect to the former , credit institutions report the rates and 
balances of the following instruments:  trade discounts ,  credit accounts , 
unsecured loans and mortgage-backed loans . 
For transactions involving variable interest rates J the information 
is less precise. Here institutions report the rates on transactions in terms 
of the period when the rate is to be revised, but, in the absence of 
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information on the balance, a simple arithmetic mean is calculated. The 
resulting figure is then averaged out with the fixed rate by using as a 
weighting the ratio of variable-rate loans to the total credit granted. 
Composite interest rates for deposits were obtained by aggregating 
the interest rates of sight deposits, savings deposits, term deposits, debt 
instruments issued at a discount, and repos . With respect to interest 
rates on sight deposits , several specific problems are discussed below. 
The balance of sight deposits can be classified into two categories 
according to their remuneration: high-yield deposits and deposits 
generating little or no yield. The interest rates on sight deposits reported 
by credit institutions refer to high-yield deposits, for which information 
in terms of volume is unavailable{20j •  To estimate the percentage of the 
total balance of sight deposits represented by accounts that fall within the 
interest-bearing category, the effective interest rate of low-yield 
deposits must be known, but here again no information is available. To 
overcome this J several assumptions were made regarding the interest 
rates of these accounts in an interval of 0 . 5% to 1 . 5% ;  as the results were 
practically the same in all cases, we assumed an annual yield of 1%. Since 
information is available on the average cost of sight deposits, with t.his 
hypothesis we estimated the percentage of low- and zero-yield deposits 
(a1) , starting from the following relation(21) : 
where: 
c = annualised average cost of sight deposits. 
( 20) Under Banco de Espafia Circular 15/88, institutions are only 
required to report their rates for high-yield deposits . 
(21) It is assumed that the entire outstanding. balance of interest­
bearing deposits is remunerated at the rate ' reported for new 
transactions. 
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[ ( interest paid cia 
) • 1 c = 1 + --�---:-------;-c/a - 1 x 100 average quarterly balance 
81 = percentage of low-yield deposits . 
b, = 1% annual rate (low yield) .  
b1 ;;; interest rate on sight deposits reported by credit institutions (high 
yield) . 
whence the percentage of low-yield deposits : 
a, 
The calculation of the lending and deposit rates for each 
institution's transactions with customers provides a way of obtaining, 
through aggregation, the rates for the bank group and the savings bank 
group , whose level and behaviour were found to be similar to those of the 
rates calculated in Cuenca (1994) (22) • 
The composite rates were constructed with a quarterly periodicity 
(the frequency of the data that were available for the transactions' 
breakdown by term) and were calculated for each institution for the 
period 1988-1994. 
The following procedure was used to calculate the composite 
interest rates : 
(22) In theory , these rates should be the same. However, small 
discrepancies arise due to the different criteria applied in the data­
editing process and, as of 1992, the different weight of term 
transactions . 
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I .  Calculation of the simple quarterly average for all variables 
for which monthly data were available . 
2 .  Calculation of the aggregate rates of each instrument, using 
the balance at each term as the weighting(2JJ• In this 
calculation, if the terms do not coincide , they must be 
presented in a homogeneous form with respect to interest 
rates and the outstanding balances of the transactions . 
3 .  Construction of a composite rate starting from the aggregate 
rate of each instrument, weighted by the instrument's 
balance in the balance sheet. 
The procedure used to construct these rates differs from the one 
used in Cuenca (1994) in the following aspect s :  
1 .  Order of aggregation for instruments and institutions 
In Cuenca ( 1994) information on the rates and balances of 
aggregate transactions for the total of banks and the total of savings 
banks is used, and the aggregation is then made by instrument , 
distinguishing within each instrument the different terms of issue. In this 
paper, composite rates are obtained for each institution; afterwards ,  if 
necessary, the rates for groups of institutions can be calculated. 
2 .  Time order of aggregation 
In Cuenca ( 1994) the rates calculated had a monthly periodicity, 
whereas the individually calculated rates were quarterly , since part of 
the information used was that reported by the institutions on a quarterly 
basis . 
(23) It should be borne in mind that the information by term and 
rate Changed as of 1992, in accordance with Banco de Espana Circular 
4/91 . 
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3 .  Weightings of assets and liabilities in the aggregation 
Until 1992 , credit institutions reported on a monthly basis the rates 
applied in each transaction and the balances of the same . However, Banco 
de Espana Circular 4/91 , effective as of 1992 , led to several changes in 
the information about the term structure of the balances .  As a result, 
institutions no longer reported on a monthly basis the disaggregated 
balances of each instrument for each term, although they continued to 
provide this information on a quarterly basis. As of 1992,  the information 
on interest rates for each instrument and each term was weighted in 
Cuenca (1994) by each institution's global balance in said instrument , 
with no distinction drawn by the transaction's term, obtaining this 
balance directly from the monthly balance sheet of each institution . In 
this way, for each instrument, each institution has the same relative 
weight in all the terms at which transactions are carried out . 
However, the present paper, based on a quarterly time frame for 
which sufficient information is available , obtains a composite rate for each 
institution , in which the rates of each instrument at each term are 
weighted by the respective balance . 
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APPENDIX II. MODELS 
The defini:tions of the variables used in the analysis are presented 
in Table A2 . 1 ,  and the models estimated for lending and deposit prices by 
group of institution are given in Tables A2 . 2  and A2 . 3 .  
The equations were estimated in levels (except in the case of the 
lending rate of Group 2 ,  which was estimated in differences ) ,  since there 
is no indication that any type of correlation exists between the regressor 
used -the interbank rate- and the individual effects . Indeed, the absence 
of said correlation is evidenced in the fact that both the intra-group 
estimations and the estimations in levels are practically the same . 
In the aforementioned case of Group 2 ,  there were indications of 
non-stationarity in the residuals of the equations estimated with the 
intra-group estimators) and it was deemed more appropriate to estimate 
the model in first differences , 
The estimation method of ordinary least squares was used, 
calculating standard errors by applying formulas similar to those 
proposed by White ( 1980) to take into account the heteroscedasticity in 
the cross section and the autocorrelation in the residuals( 24) ,  
In the estimations , we alternatively used the interbank rate on 
outstanding transactions and the 3-month interbank rate, obtaining 
similar results in the total responses of prices to the interbank rate, 
although in the short run the responsiveness to the 3-month rate was 
weaker than to the rate on outstanding transactions (25) ,  Tables A2 , 2 
and A2, 3 give the estimates under which the best results were obtained , 
In these estimates , as would be expected in the presence of individual 
effects , the first- and second-order correlations in the residuals appear 
to be significant, unlike the case of intra-group estimations , which are 
practically the same as those presented, 
(24) In the presence of heteroscedasticity in the cross section , 
this method is more efficient than generalised least squares . 
( 25) The rate on outstanding transactions is a weighted average 
of rates on these transactions and, consequently , is "softer" than the 3-
month rate (see Manzano and Galmes, 1995 ) .  
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DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
u" � rate of in.titut.j.OlI 1 at _to t 
'" o.pc.it. rate of i .. Ut.QUOlI 1 at. _t t. 
n, 3· .... t.b 1aterbank rae. at _to t. 
LENDING RATESl 
GROUP l .  
Variable eo.ff1c1.at 8b1t.1rt1c t 
U o.n ll.' 
U - 0.83 21.9 
Flnt-ordU AutocorHIAUon tut2 4 • ., 
S."OIld-or.s.r Autocor�lAUon t_t2 3.17 
GROUP 2 .  
Variable Coeff1c1ect Sbltletic t 
U 0.25 10. 3 
U - 0. 24 , . ,  
U - , 0.115 , ., 
Plnt-order Au�rel.ation tMt2 -2.97 
SlICoo<!'-or4er alltocorrellltlon t .. t2 0.27 
GROUP 3 .  
Var1&We CoefUe1eat ablttetic t 
U O. " 9 .94 
U - o.n 5.00 
Firet.-ocd� Autocorrel.aUon tMt2 2.11 
Second-order Aut.ocorHIAtioa t_t
2 2 . 70 
GROUP 4 .  
Variable Coeffici_t su.ti.rtic t 
U 0.75 7.53 
U - 0.43 4 .32 
'iret-order AU�HIAt1011 tMt2 1 .77 
SlICond-ordoir eutocorrel.aUon tMt2 1.66 
2 TheM eblt18Uce Are dietrllmted according- to &(0.1). WheN the null hypothes18 18 thll 
Abeen". of AutOCorHIAUOI1. 
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DEPOSIT RATESl 
GROUP 1 .  
Variahl. c-rtieient suu.tic: to 
" O.ll 8.02 
" - , 0.46 19.54 
F1rn-ordou &Ut.oo:orr.l&UCII t.t2 4. 11 
s.cond-or"'-r &utoeorr.l&Uon t.t2 l.88 
GROUP 2 _ 
Variahl. eo.tticient SUU.tic: t 
" 0.20 4.ll 
" -"- 0.42 9.U 
F1r.t-ord.r &ut.oo:orr.laUon tMt2 4.6$ 
!l«Clld-or"'-r &utoeorr.laUCII t.t2 4.32 
GROUP 3 _  
variabl. c-tticiomt StaU.tic: to 
" 0.24 1.80 
" - 0.45 3.64 
Fir.t-ord.r .ut.oo:oral.&UCII tMt2 l .24 
S..,..,d-ordoor a.,tocorr.l.&t.1C11 t.t2 l.19 
GROUP 4 _  
Var�lao eo.rric1erlt StaUa't1c t 
" 0.4& 4.47 
" - 0. 34 3.72 
F1r&t-order .. utcc:ornl&UCII t.t2 2.79 
8«:Or\d-ordar .utocornlaUCII t.t2 2.76 
The .. ..  tathtiea an d1at.r1butOid Aceord.1ng to .(0,1),  wMa tM null hypoth8ah 1& the 
&l>aenc. of autocoraJ.&UCII. 
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